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1 NOV 1979

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]  
NFAC/FOIA

25X1

FROM : [REDACTED]  
National Intelligence Officer

SUBJECT : Mandatory Classification Review

1. It is impossible to make a determination without seeing actual messages to ascertain whether or not sensitive sources or methods are involved.

2. Also, some messages refer to US Government relations with foreign governments. Sensitivity on this aspect must also be ascertained. Probably State or the NSC itself would be best qualified to make the appropriate judgments.

25X1



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5			
6			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
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Remarks:			
<p>Please review the attached document and make appropriate recommendations and sign worksheet. Please note the number of personnel and hours involved and return to this office.</p>			
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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
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[illegible]

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OFFICE		DATE		OFFICE		DATE			

Approved for Release 2000/01/06 : CIA-RDP81-000100R000200190001-1

## Draft Memo

1. Impossible to make a determination without seeing actual messages to ascertain whether or not sensitive sources or methods involved.

2. Also, some messages refer to U.S. Government relations with foreign governments. Sensitivity on this aspect must also be ascertained. Probably State or the NSC itself would be best qualified to make appropriate judgment.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

1 November 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

FROM :

[Redacted]  
National Intelligence Officer for  
China-EAP

SUBJECT : Schedule Revision -- South Korean NIE

1. As you know, we have scheduled an NIE on South Korea for completion in December. In light of Pak's assassination last Friday, we have reviewed with OPA the practicality of doing an estimate in that time frame.

2. We are in agreement that an NIE on South Korea has even higher priority now, but conclude it must be put off until questions on succession and the structure of the new government are closer to being resolved. That could take us into January 1980. We propose, therefore, to slip the estimate to the first quarter of next year.

3. To bridge the gap, OPA has agreed to begin work on a paper that would examine issues related to succession and the formation of a new government. While this paper is to be produced in house, once completed we may attempt to have the Community certify its judgments should that approach seem useful.

All portions of this  
document are SECRET.

Distribution:

- 1 - D/NFAC
- 1 - DD/NFAC
- 1 - D/OPA
- 1 - D/OWI/PAB/OPB
- 2 - NIO/Ch-EAP
- 1 - NFAC Registry

DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER  
REVIEW ON NOV 85  
Derived from Multiple

1 November 1979

3

25X1 Dear [redacted]

STAT Thank you very much for the kind words and the cable you sent concerning my visit [redacted]. I greatly enjoyed the opportunity to return and to meet with so many of my old friends. Your assistance in this regard is much appreciated.

STAT As always, I found [redacted] to be well informed, lively, and stimulating in our discussions of mutual problems and concepts. I believe that you are fortunate to have such competent opposite members.

Warm regards, and let me know when you will be in Washington next. I am sure that we will have a lot to talk about.

Sincerely,

STAT PS: [redacted]

STAT [redacted]

[redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

1 November 1979

25X1

[Redacted]

Rockford, Illinois 61101

25X1

Dear [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] and I are extremely grateful to you for the wonderful evening we enjoyed at the Kennedy Center and Washington Hilton with you, [Redacted] and all your (and we hope, our) other good friends. Everything was just perfect -- the music, the banquet, and above all the companionship. You were extremely kind to think of us and to make it possible for us to take part in what the Washington Post described as a "glittering social occasion."

25X1

Please let me know if you expect to be in Washington again soon, and if I can be of any help to you. With all best wishes to you and [Redacted].

Sincerely,

[Redacted]

4

AT

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #5975-79  
2 November 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.  
Director for National Foreign Assessment

STAT FROM :   
National Intelligence Officer, CH/EAP

SUBJECT : Concept Paper and Terms of Reference  
on NIE on the Philippines (NIE 56-1-79)

1. I attach a concept paper and Terms of Reference for NIE 56-1-79. We have met informally with representatives from INR and DIA, and separately with the Senior Review Panel. Their informal comments are - in part - reflected in the draft.

2. As you know, we are committed to finish the estimate by the end of the year. We propose to schedule the first formal meeting with NFIB representatives during the week of 12 November to seek their blessing on the concept paper. We would be grateful for your early review and approval of the attachments.

Attachments:  
Concept Paper  
Terms of Reference

Distribution:  
Orig - D/NFA w/atts  
3 - SRP w/atts  
1 - SA/PP w/atts  
② - NIO/CH/EAP w/atts *Chiron*

STAT

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2 November 1979

STAT

[Redacted]

25X1

Dear [Redacted]

STAT

Thank you for your hospitality and assistance during my recent visit. [Redacted] It was good to get back, and I much appreciated the opportunity to meet with so many old friends at the Residence. The opportunity to talk with the Prime Minister was also an unexpected and welcome boon.

I would appreciate your thanking [Redacted] for all their help. I enjoyed seeing them.

25X1

Best wishes to you and [Redacted]

Sincerely,

[Redacted]

STAT

[Redacted]

STAT

[Redacted]


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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

8 November 1979

25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: 

FROM :

NIO/China-EAP

SUBJECT : Comments on NFAC Production Plans

1. I have no major comments concerning the production plans submitted by the various NFAC Offices, and regard them in general as imaginative and responsive to continuing intelligence needs.

2. However, a few observations:

-- In the OPA projections for China, there are two papers listed which are obvious spin-offs from NIEs presently underway on Sino-Soviet Relations and China's Defense Policy and Armed Forces. The items in question are entitled Sino-Soviet Relations: A Review and Look Ahead" (IA) and "The Politics of Modernizing the PLA" (IA). Are both these projects necessary? The first would appear to be a clear overlap with the Sino-Soviet NIE, and the second to contain elements discussed in the China military NIE.

-- Similarly, in "Other East Asia" listings, there are several papers on Indonesia containing subject matter which also will be dealt with in the NIE on Prospects for Internal Stability in Indonesia. Overlap? Redundancy?



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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Executive Registry

79-5280

National Intelligence Officers

8 November 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment  
FROM : [REDACTED]  
National Intelligence Officer for  
China-EAP  
SUBJECT : Proposed Consultant on East Asia Pacific Issues

1. Action Requested: That you approve my recommendation to use [REDACTED] as a consultant on issues in the East Asian/Pacific region of concern to US policy.

2. Background: We have underway or in the planning stage a number of NIEs and other studies on issues of concern to US policy in the East Asian/Pacific region. These include two NIEs covering Korea (North Korean Indications and Warning and the Future of US-ROK Relations); one on the Philippines (Prospects of Internal Stability) and one on Indonesia (also on prospects for internal stability). In addition we are projecting an IIM on the durability of ASEAN as an effective regional organization. Regarding the Philippine NIE, you may know Gene Tighe has expressed concern over the potential for instability in the Philippines, given doubts about Marcos' ability to manage the economy and increasing criticism of the regime by opponents of martial law. The need for the estimates on Korea in the immediate present are self-evident.

3. In all of these projects I believe it would be highly desirable to draw on informed judgments of individuals outside this Agency who are familiar with the countries of the region and with the respective political and economic complexities. One such person whom I would like to bring aboard as a consultant is [REDACTED]

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102

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I have been impressed with his instincts on all of the countries where he has been stationed, and believe he would be a great asset to us. In particular, I contemplate using him in connection with the Philippine NIE, hopefully as early as December. Clearances will be arranged; and none of the projects will use codeword material. He would be compensated at the usual rate.

4. Recommendation: That you approve the use of [ ] as a consultant.

25X1

25X

APPROVED:

14 NOV 1979

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Date

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THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

16 November 1979

NOTE FOR: Martin Packman

FROM :   
NIO/China-EAP

Attached per your request is the study prepared by our Office of Economic Research on China's civil air service.

Martin Packman  
Deputy Director for Research/INR  
Room 6535  
State

~~SECRET~~

X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

7 November 1979

25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

NIO/China

SUBJECT : EA/PRCM Request for PRC Civil Air  
Service Study

The attached memorandum has been prepared in response to the request for a study of China's civil air service by Martin Packman, Deputy Director for Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. Any further questions may be addressed to [REDACTED] on

25X1 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

/ Chief  
China Resources Branch  
China Division, Office of  
Economic Research

Attachment:  
As stated

~~SECRET~~

//

Distribution: ER M 79-10610

Orig. & 1 - Addressee

1 - D/NFAC

1 - NSC Coordinator, [REDACTED]

1 - DD/ER, D/ER, EO/ER

1 - NIO/PE [REDACTED]

1 - OER/PS [REDACTED]

1 - OPA/PS [REDACTED]

3 - PPG/R&D [REDACTED]

1 - S/IT

1 - D/C

2 - C/RE

OER/C/RE/ [REDACTED]

(7 November 1979)

25X1


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
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People's Republic of China  
Civil Air Routes



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM

October 24, 1979

STAT TO:

[Redacted]  
NIO/China  
Central Intelligence Agency

FROM: Martin Packman *MP*  
Deputy Director for Research  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Request for Studies from EA/PRCM

The Director of EA/PRCM, Charles Freeman, has asked us to pass on to you requests for studies on three topics which are of high level concern to the EA Bureau as it pursues bilateral negotiations with the PRC in the coming months. These are:

- ✓ (1) Civil Aviation: general background on current air routes, PRC physical capabilities, and policy; the experience of other countries in negotiating CivAv agreements with the PRC; and the content of other agreements (especially the Philippines-PRC agreement) with regard to both Taiwan and technical issues (by November 9);
- × (2) the negotiating experience of other countries with regard to export credit facilities (by November 16);
- × × (3) the experience of other countries since 1949 in handling diplomatic properties upon establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC (by November 2);
- × (4) China's approach to negotiating maritime agreements (by December 21); and
- × × (5) China's approach to negotiating consular agreements (by November 16).

The EA Bureau appreciates work now being done to downgrade the classification of a recent CIA paper on PRC hydro-electric power, so they can more readily use it.

X OER

× × OPA

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Central Intelligence Agency

NIO/Ch. EAP  
Chrono

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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

19 November 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM : [REDACTED]  
National Intelligence Officer for  
China-East Asia Pacific

SUBJECT : November Warning Meeting [REDACTED]

1. You or your representative are cordially invited to attend the November warning meeting for East Asia Pacific in the 5 G 00 conference room, CIA Headquarters, at 1400 hours on Wednesday, 28 November. Please provide the name of your representative to [REDACTED] no later than COB 26 November 1979. [REDACTED]

2. There will be no fixed agenda. [REDACTED]

## Distribution

DIA - [REDACTED]  
Army - Joe L. Butcher  
Navy - Stephen Portenlanger  
Air Force - Paul Spencer  
State - Robert Drexler  
NSA - [REDACTED]

## Distribution:

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

30 November 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Lehman  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM :   
National Intelligence Officer for China-EAP

SUBJECT : Proposed Alert Memorandum

1. I am concerned that the attention of Senior Policy Officers understandably preoccupied by the crisis in Iran needs to be redrawn to the implications of fast moving developments in Indochina, particularly along the Thai-Kampuchean border. Before long the United States could be:

- Finding itself the principal in partnership with the Thais managing an enclave of as many as 1.5 million Kampuchean refugees, which implies responsibility well beyond the supply of food and medicine over an extended period of time. Among these refugees are armed Kampuchean resistance elements anxious to maintain cross-border operations.
- Witnessing a major Vietnamese offensive (reportedly set for 22 December) aimed at sealing off the entire Thai-Kampuchea border which, if successful, could in effect create a common frontier between Thailand and Vietnam.

2. I therefore propose that we prepare and the DCI issue an Alert Memorandum which raises the possibilities of a much larger exposure of US interests in that area that I believe is currently contemplated.



THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

28 November 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THRU : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

FROM :   
National Intelligence Officer for China-EAP

SUBJECT : The Situation in the Philippines

1. Action Requested: This memorandum is for your information only.

2. Background: You asked if things are as bad in the Philippines as suggested in Richard Kessler's article "The Precarious Philippines," Christian Science Monitor, 21 November 1979.

3. To be sure, there is uncertainty and concern within the Community about the Marcos' and the Philippines. You may know that at DIA's request we are moving ahead on an estimate originally scheduled for completion in the second quarter of next year. We now hope to have it substantially completed by the end of this year. The question of continued access to our Philippine bases lies behind this request. You may also be aware of plans to feature the Philippines in a Presidential briefing in January.

4. More to the point, Mr. Kessler has done a responsible job identifying several key issues. However, while agreeing generally with the analysis contained in the estimate, I consider the tone of Kessler's arguments to be too dire and am inclined to be less pessimistic about the cumulative effect of the adverse factors which he cites. Marcos might well have elections of some sort before too long; our Embassy is betting they will occur before the end of 1980 although it is by no means clear whether elections per se will relieve tensions. Our OER people are cautious about the economy, but they would come up short, as would I, of suggesting that weakness there is producing a general state of despair among the Filipinos. Finally, while the article identifies sources of opposition, the problem is one of estimating how those elements might come together to present a significant threat to Marcos.

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REVIEW ON NOV 85

5. There remains the possibility that Marcos (who apparently is not in the best of health) will die suddenly or be assassinated by one of his many enemies. Were that to happen, radical changes in the Philippine political situation could occur very rapidly, with the outcome hard to predict. Just how much influence the US could exercise would also be hard to calculate.

6. I would emphasize that we are not simply worrying about the Philippines; an estimate is well underway, and I look to it to pull together the Community's collective wisdom in a set of judgments that will suggest how developments in that important country might effect our bases, overall stability in Asia, and the ASEAN alliance.

7. Attached is a copy of the paper sent to the Community containing the concept and terms of reference for the Philippine NIE.



Attachment  
As Stated

All portions of the  
document are SECRET.

25X1

Distribution to NFAC 6396-79

1 each - DCI

DDCI

ER

DD/NFA

NIO/Ch-EAP Chrono

NIO/CH-EAP File

OPA/EAP/SEA

OER

NFAC Reg

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25X1

27 NOV 1979

Wednesday, November 21, 1979

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

## OPINION AND COMMENTARY

### The precarious Philippines

By Richard J. Kessler

The future of Ferdinand E. Marcos's martial-law régime in the Philippines is in question. Opposition forces are gathering momentum, and Marcos has few policy options open to resolve peacefully the impending crisis. Once again he has postponed elections because of the nation's political and economic instability. Now is the time to debate possible American responses to the deteriorating Philippine situation.

The present crisis is a result of Marcos's failure to establish peace and order and to abolish the old oligarchy hindering the country's development — promises he made after declaring martial law in September, 1972. Today rebel forces are still fighting. The old oligarchy has been replaced by a new one of the President's and his wife Imelda's family and friends.

The economy is Marcos's greatest failure. The Philippines' growth rate is much lower than that of other developing Asian countries. Marcos blames his economic problems on the OPEC oil price hikes. But putting the onus for poor economic performance on outside forces such as OPEC is difficult for many Filipinos to understand.

As despair grows, opposition forces are gaining strength. There are four major sources of organized opposition: the Maoist-inspired New People's Army, various Muslim secessionist groups in Mindanao, the Roman Catholic Church, and several pre-martial-law political leaders.



*Marcos is viewed by some as an American puppet with US military assistance in maintaining his dictatorship and US economic investment as the reward for so doing. . . . [American] influence must be used carefully if we are to avoid being accused of imposing a new leader on the Philippines and to avoid the bloodshed which might ensue with Marcos's fall.*

Taken separately, these opposition forces threaten little, but together they show the wide extent of dissatisfaction with Marcos. Both historical and cultural traditions indicate that Marcos's fall would be the result of a multitude of disparate factions under no one leader. There would probably be a series of increasing but isolated incidents of rural and urban violence with a gradual breakdown in government control, indicating that Marcos has lost his ability to govern.

The United States remains the most important political and economic force in the Philippines. Clark Air Force Base and Subic Naval Base are important. In the eyes of the project US power in the Pacific and the Indian

Ocean, while other Southeast Asian states look to America as a counterweight to Soviet encroachment, especially as the Soviet-backed forces of Vietnam continue the Indo-China war. American banks and businesses are together the largest single foreign investor in the Philippines, a result in part of Marcos's liberal foreign investment code; and the US continues to be the Philippines' most important trading partner. It is a mutual dependence, both economically and politically, and it is further solidified by the Philippines' ties as America's former colony, the 30,000 Filipinos who emigrate to the US every year, and the strength of their belief in democracy and capitalism.

Marcos is viewed by some as an American

puppet with US military assistance in maintaining his dictatorship and US economic investment as the reward for so doing. Any new leadership will have to alter the military and economic status quo to some degree. But with no clear-cut leader among his opponents, the opposition will ironically no doubt turn to the US Embassy to anoint a new leader. Despite cries of imperialism, Filipinos retain strong goodwill toward the US, and strong US support is seen as essential to any new government.

However, this influence must be used carefully if we are to avoid being accused of imposing a new leader on the Philippines and to avoid the bloodshed which might ensue with Marcos's fall. American influence is both political and economic. Though Marcos maintains a strong, loyal palace guard that can be expected to resist strongly, US military advisers are reported to have wide contacts and influence within the Philippine command that could restrain these forces if pressures mount on Marcos to step down.

It is important that America use its influence now when it has the opportunity to help restore democracy in the Philippines, rather than attempt to use it later when violence may split the country into warring factions. Both Iran and Nicaragua have illustrated the consequences of the US entering too late, with too little. In the Philippines the opportunity and the responsibility are ours.

Richard J. Kessler has recently returned from Manila where he was a visiting research associate at the College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

26 November 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM :

[REDACTED]  
National Intelligence Officer for China-EAP

SUBJECT : Briefing by Colonel George Osborne

1. Colonel George Osborne, Political Science Department, US Military Academy, will be in Washington on 5 December for debriefing on his recent visit to the PRC and lectures he delivered to the PLA Political Academy. You are cordially invited to send representatives to this debriefing in Room 6E60 at 1000 hours.

2. The session will last as long as participants desire. Please contact [REDACTED] by COB 4 December with the names of your representatives.



26 November 1979

LDX TO: Mr. Robert Drexler  
Director, INR/REA  
Room 8840  
Department of State  
632-0146 *1332*  
Attn: Stanley Ifshin

FROM:   
National Intelligence Officer  
for China-EAP  
7 E 62, CIA Hqs

STAT

Col. Jack B. Churchill  
HQDA (DAMI)-FI  
Room 2E473, The Pentagon  
697-3398  
Major Wally Astor  
AF/INE  
Room 4B136, The Pentagon  
694-5261

Cdr. Stephen Portenlanger  
NAV OPS  
Room 5 B 670, The Pentagon  
697-3671

STAT

Mr. Douglas MacEachen  
Director, SWS  
1C925, The Pentagon  
695-0031

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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

30 NOV 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM : [REDACTED]  
Assistant National Intelligence Officer  
for China

SUBJECT : Warning Assessment: China

1. Attached is the assessment prepared on the basis of Community views expressed at the warning meeting held on 19 November. This memorandum has not been coordinated with the participants but is being circulated among them.

2. The next warning meeting will be held on Monday, 17 December at 1400 hours in room 7 E 62, CIA Headquarters. Please provide the name of your representative to [REDACTED] prior to COB Friday, 14 December 1979.

Attachment  
As Stated

## Distribution:

State - Mr. Robert Drexler  
NSA - [REDACTED]  
Army - Col. Jack B. Churchill  
Air Force - Major Wally Astor  
Navy - Cdr. Stephen Portenlanger  
DIA - [REDACTED]  
SWS - Mr. Douglas J. MacEachen

SECRET

NFAC 6454-79

## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

30 NOV 1979

National Intelligence Officers

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM :   
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for China

SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: China

1. Analysts attending the monthly meeting found little in the past several weeks to change their assessments of recent months. Potentially troubling situations remained on the horizon, but analysts generally agreed that little had occurred to make potential threats immediate.

2. Sino-Soviet Affairs

There was general agreement that the talks in Moscow had accomplished little or nothing, that suspicions remained high on both sides of the table, and that both parties were maneuvering for immediate (and often petty) advantage in the opening round of what were likely to be marathon talks. There was no sign of give in the Chinese position, which with its emphasis on the Soviet presence in Mongolia and Vietnam offered absolutely no attraction to the Soviets. Most analysts believed, however, that Chinese reassessment of long-standing strictures against "revisionism" (and specifically throwing into ideological disrepute a series of vituperative attacks on Moscow issued when the Sino-Soviet dispute went public in the early 1960s) was potentially of considerable importance and over a long period of time was likely to affect the nature of the relationship. A few analysts thought this development largely irrelevant, and all agreed that the geopolitical element of the dispute had long been more important than the ideological dimension. After some discussion analysts generally concluded that recent Soviet deployments in Mongolia did not drastically change the balance along the border or presage military action against China, nor did they suggest a major change in the wider context in which the military balance could be viewed.

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### 3. Indochina Situation

Analysts took note of the continuing Vietnamese offensive in western Kampuchea as well as the somewhat heightened rhetoric on the part of both China and Vietnam regarding alledged border violations, but concluded that the overall situation generally remained static. There was general agreement that the Chinese had not positioned themselves so that they could accept with some equanimity the virtual destruction of the Pol Pot forces (so long as a few tattered remains existed somewhere in the country). Most analysts thought that the Vietnamese would avoid major, prolonged incursions into Thailand in the course of the current offensive, but there was general agreement that such incursions, if they occurred (and particularly if they resulted in significant clashes with Thai troops) could lead China to attempt to teach Hanoi a second "lesson." There was a general consensus that Beijing hoped to avoid this alternative, and most analysts believed that China did not have to make a decision at this point. Several participants noted, however, that the Vietnamese offensive naturally could bring that decision-point closer.

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